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REVITALIZING THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN FAMILY 
LAW 
Jane C. Murphy* 
Mercy, detached from Justice, grows unmerciful. 
-C.S. Lewisl 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The way families resolve disputes has dramatically changed over the 
last decade. Scholars have focused on a number of substantive law 
changes that have contributed to this transformation. These include the 
changing definitions of marriage,2 parenthood,3 and families.4 But less 
attention has been paid to the enormous changes that have taken place in 
the processes surrounding family dispute resolution.5 These changes 
• Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A. 1975, Boston College; J.D. 
1978, New York University School of Law. I wish to thank Professors Theresa Glennon, Wallace 
Mylniec, Bill Richman, Matthew Fraidin, and Leigh Goodmark for their comments on earlier drafts of 
the Article. Many thanks to Jana Singer whose insights from our collaboration on an earlier work about 
the issues addressed here are reflected throughout this Article. I also thank Megan Beechener and Sarah 
Hale for their excellent research assistance and the University of Baltimore Educational Foundation for 
its financial support. Earlier versions of this Article were presented at the American Association of Law 
Schools 2007 Annual Meeting and the 30th International Congress on Law and Mental Health 
(University of Padua, June, 2007). Finally this Article is dedicated to the many judges, masters, and 
lawyers who labor in the family courts. 
1. C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment. in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 301, 
308 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971). 
2. See. e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Marriage & Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 421 (2008). 
3. See. e.g., Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 
38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809 (2006); Theresa Glennon, Still Partners? Examining the Consequences of Post-
Dissolution Parenting, 41 FAM. L.Q. 105 (2007); Sheelagh McGuinness & Amel Alghrani, Gender and 
Parenthood: The Casefor Realignment. 16 MED. L. REv. 261 (2008). 
4. Mellisa Holtzman, Definitions of the Family as Impetus for Legal Change in Custody 
Decision Making: Suggestions from an Empirical Case Study, 31 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY I (2006) 
(discussing the changing definition of family); Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the 
Legal Understanding of Care giving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REv. 385 (2008) (analyzing the changing 
composition families and the reliance on more than parents to care for children); Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse, "It All Depends on What You Mean by Home": Toward a Communitarian Theory of the 
"Nontraditional" Family, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 569 (1996) (discussing the changing patterns in marriage 
and divorce and how these impact family structure). 
5. But see AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 6-11 (2002) (embracing alternative dispute resolution as a tool for resolving 
parental disputes after divorce); see also RECONCENING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN 
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have been even more comprehensive and have "fundamentally altered 
the way in which disputing families interact with the legal system.,,6 
Both the methods and goals of legal intervention for families in conflict 
have changed. The roles of judges and lawyers are fundamentally 
different and less important in this new regime where dispute resolution 
has largely moved out of the courtroom to "problem solving,,7 teams. 
Taking a "holistic" approach,8 these interdisciplinary teams seek to 
address both legal and nonlegal problems facing the families that come 
to courts seeking legal remedies. 
These developments have profound implications for the family justice 
system. They also reflect a broader jurisprudential shift away from the 
traditional values of the adversary system in both civil9 and criminal 
justice. \0 In many ways, the debate about the relative virtues of the 
structured procedures of the adversary system versus the informality and 
flexibility of the new family courts reflects the same values clash in the 
law versus equity debates of sixteenth-century England; many of the 
same questions and tradeoffs are present. 11 Is the adversary system a 
LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW AND FAMILY DISSOLUTION 409-24 (Robin Fretwell Wilson 
ed., 2006). 
6. RESOLVING F AMIL Y CONFLICTS xiii (Jana B. Singer & Jane C. Murphy eds., 2008). 
7. Symposium, Problem Solving Courts: A Conversation with the Experts, U. MD. 1. RACE, 
RELIGION, GENDER, & CLASS (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Problem Solving Courts] (defining 
problem solving courts as "an alternative court structure in which all participants work together to solve 
the chronic behavioral issues often underlying the criminal or civil offense."); see also GREG BERMAN & 
JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE (2005). 
8. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babb, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Family Law Jurisprudence: 
Application of an Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. LJ. 775, 807 (1997). 
9. See, e.g., DANA KRALSTEIN, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, A COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY 
JUSTICE MODEL (2007), http://www .courtinnovation.org! _uploads/documentsfBaltimore_Eval.pdf (a 
report documenting the efforts to create problem solving courts to address a range of civil matters). 
10. See, e.g., MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, THE NEW YORK STATE 
ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION: POLICIES, PARTICIPANTS AND IMPACTS (2003), 
http://www .courtinnova tion .org! _ up loadsl documen tsl drulL court_eva\. pdf (discussing alternative 
criminal courts for drug offenders). The shift in the criminal area also has its critics. See, e.g., Josh 
Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REv. 783 (2008) (discussing the drug courts' failure 
to rehabilitate the genuine addicts but only allow volitional users to game the system); Tamar M. 
Meekins, "Specialized Justice ": The Over-Emergence of Specialty Courts and the Threat of a New 
Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1,26-27 (2006); Mae C. Quinn, Anna Moscowitz 
Kross and the Home Term Part: A Second Look at the Nation's First Criminal Domestic Violence 
Court, 41 AKRON L. REv. 733 (2008); Mae C. Quinn, Women as Perpetrators of Crime: Revisiting Anna 
Moscowitz Kross's Critique of New York City's Women's Court: The Continued Problem of Solving the 
"Problem" of Prostitution with Specialized Criminal Courts, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J 665 (2006) 
(compares the early twentieth-century New York City Women's courts with today's Midtown Court find 
both fail to address the problems of prostitution and may jeopardize the due process rights of 
defendants. ). 
II. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 18 (1969); I 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND 
AMERICA § 29-31 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1877) (analyzing and explaining the British roots of 
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source of rigidity or protection for family law litigants? Does the new 
system permit the flexibility needed to tailor decisions to the needs of 
vastly different families? Or does the new regime's broad discretion 
jeopardize fundamental fairness with informal, inconsistent, and 
unreviewable decisions?12 
The proliferation of problem-solving courts around the country has 
gained widespread media attention. \3 Policymakers have also offered 
commentary on their efficacy in addressing a wider range of social ills. 14 
But there has been little critical analysis of the broader question of 
whether this profound shift in our justice system is sound. If, as many 
concede, the adversary system fails families in variety of ways, do we 
address its deficiencies or dramatically change its mission? In their zeal 
to address the social problems that bring people to court, have the 
reformers given appropriate weight to the values underlying the 
traditional legal system? And have they adequately explored the risks of 
the new paradigm, particularly on low-income litigants? 
This Article addresses these questions and reframes the debate about 
problem-solving courts by evaluating the relative benefits of the 
therapeutic and adversarial approaches in resolving family conflicts. 
the American courts of equity); see also Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth oj Discretionary Justice in 
Family Law: The Child Support Experiment, 70 N. C. L. REV. 209 (1991). 
12. See generally Problem Solving Courts, supra note 6. The debate about the constitutionality 
of problem solving courts has just begun to reach the courts, primarily in the context of due process 
challenges to drug courts hearing criminal cases. The cases decided thus far have just begun to explore 
the issue. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 971 A.2d 932 (Md. 2009) (refusing to address the challenge that 
Maryland's drug courts violate due process because issue not properly preserved); Evans v. State, 667 
S.E.2d 183 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (holding state had a mtional basis for excluding defendant from drug 
court); State v. Rogers, 170 P.3d 881 (Idaho 2007) (vacated lower court's ruling because defendant did 
not receive his due process rights when terminated from the drug court program); State v. Filer, 771 
So.2d 700 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (upheld a guilty plea induced on promise of entrance into a drug court 
program but defendant was ineligible due to prior convictions); State v. Cassill-Skilton, 94 P.3d 407 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (vacated drug conviction because of lack of due process when defendant 
tenninated drug court program). Constitutional challenges to the new regime have also been mised in 
the context of mandatory mediation for certain family disputes. See e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public 
Justice: Toward a State Action Theory oj Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REv. 577, 590 n.42 
(1997). 
13. See, e.g., Henri E. Cauvin, Public DeJender Calls Venues Unconstitutional, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 3, 2009, available at, http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynlcontentl 
article/2009/04/02/AR2009040203732.html; Leslie Eaton & Leslie Kaufman, In Problem-Solving 
Court, Judges Turn Therapist, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.coml2005/04126/nyregionl26courts.html; Erik Eckholm, Courts Give Addicts a 
Chance to Straighten Out, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.coml2008/10/l5/us/15drugs.html?_r=I. 
14. See, e.g., Douglas B. Marlowe et a!., A Sober Assessment oj Drug Courts, 16 FED. 
SENTENCING REp. 153 (2003); c. WEST HUDDLESTON, III ET AL., NAT'L DRUG CT. iNST., PAINTING THE 
CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING 
COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (2008), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJN 
pdfll2902_PCP _ful.pdf. 
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Part One of this Article describes the changes that have contributed to 
this paradigm shift in family law. Part Two explores the profound ways 
the shift alters the traditional adversary system and the risks presented 
by these shifts. Finally, this Article concludes that before we 
fundamentally alter the mission and structure of the justice system we 
must address the deficiencies in the adversary system. It offers 
proposals to strengthen the adversary system in family law while 
incorporating selected elements of the problem-solving courts to design 
a justice system that serves all families. 
II. A PARADIGM SHIFT I5 
An overarching theme of family law reform efforts is that the 
adversary system is ill-suited to resolving disputes involving children.!6 
The primary critique by reformers begins by noting that traditional child 
access proceedings embody adversarial norms intended to minimize 
direct communication between parties and maximize the courts' role in 
decisionmaking. Divorce or custody actions are initiated by a lawsuit 
naming a plaintiff and a defendant, and settlement negotiations are 
conducted in the "shadow of the law."!7 Parties, if represented and 
advised by lawyers, reach agreements by making difficult predictions 
about who will "win" at trial. Under prevailing legal standards, the 
party who prevails is the parent who most successfully depicts the other 
parent as unfit, or who can most effectively assign blame for the parties 
failed relationship. Reformers accurately note that the acrimony 
between parents engendered by this system harms children. Social 
science research over the last two decades has made a strong case that 
children's well-being following parental breakup depends upon their 
parents' behavior during and after the separation process. 18 Much of the 
research concludes that the higher the levels of parental conflict to 
which children are exposed, the more negative the effects of family 
15. Portions of this Part are based on the Introduction to RESOLVING FAMILY CONFLICTS, supra 
note 6. 
16. See Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, In the Best Interests of Children: A Proposal to 
Transform the Adversarial System, 42 FAM. CT. REv. 203(2004). 
17. The phrase "bargaining in the shadow of the law" has become part of the language of 
negotiation and dispute resolution and refers to the role the law might play in reminding parties of a 
predicted court outcome and thus encouraging settlement. Similarly, where the law is indeterminate and 
has no predictive value, the law does little to promote settlements. The term was first introduced in a 
seminal article by Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950 (1979). 
18. See ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD 
CUSTODY, AND MEDIA nON 205 (1994). 
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dissolution. 19 
All of these circumstances have led to a call by reformers to abandon 
the adversary paradigm, in favor of more informal approaches with the 
goal of encouraging parents to develop positive post-divorce co-
parenting relationships. Nonadversary dispute resolution approaches 
adopted in newly developed family courts range from relatively well-
established court-connected mediation in divorce-related custody cases20 
to family group conferencing and other problem-solving approaches in 
child welfare proceedingsY Some lawyers have embraced the new 
approaches through "collaborative lawyering" in which lawyers pledge 
at the outset of their representation not to take a client's case to tria1.22 
As two leading reformers recently stated, "in the last quarter century, the 
process of resolving legal family disputes has, both literally and 
metaphorically, moved from confrontation toward collaboration and 
from the courtroom to the conference room.,,23 
Another element of the paradigm shift is the reconception of family 
disputes from legal events to social and emotional events.24 These 
recharacterized family disputes, reform advocates argue, require 
"collaborative," "holistic," and "interdisciplinary" interventions rather 
than zealous advocacy.25 Lawyers have become less central in the new 
19. Id.; Richard Boldt & Jana Singer, Juristocracy in the Trenches: Problem-Solving Judges and 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Drug Treatment Courts and Unified Family Courts, 65 MD. L. REV. 82, 
93-94 (2006); Vivienne Roseby, Uses of Psychological Testing in a Child·Focused Approach to Child 
Custody Evaluations, 29 FAM. L. Q. 97,104 (1995): Andrew Cherlin, The Effect of Children on Marital 
Dissolution, 14 DEMOGRAPHY 265 (1977). 
20. See, e.g., ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY 57 (2004) (describing 
the widespread use, structure, and function of mediation in child custody disputes). 
21. See, e.g., Susan M. Chandler & Marilou Giovannuci, Family Group Conferences: 
Transforming Traditional Child Welfare Policy and Practice, 42 FAM. CT. REv. 216 (2004); Clare 
Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637 (2006). 
22. Collaborative lawyering has been defined as having the unique element of a participation 
agreement with clients which prohibits the lawyer from representing the client in court if an agreement 
is not reached but promises vigorous legal assistance as part of a team negotiating an agreement. 
Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.1. 317 (2004); William H. 
Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging Practice, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 
351 (2004); see also Barbara Glesner Fines, Ethical Issues in Collaborative Lawyering, 21 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIMONIAL L. 141, 141-54 (2008) (arguing for greater ethical standards in collaborative lawyering 
agreements); John Lande & Forrest S. Mosten, Collaborative Lawyers' Duties to Screen the 
Appropriateness of Collaborative Law and Obtain Clients' Informed Consent to Use Collaborative Law, 
25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 347 (2010) (an analysis of the risks of collaborative lawyering to divorcing 
parties). 
23. Andrew Schepard & Peter Salem, Foreword to the Special Issue on the Family Law 
Education Reform Project, 44 FAM. CT. REv. 513, 516 (2006). 
24. See, e.g., Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody Disputes: From 
Fault Finder to Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 
395, 407 (2000). 
25. See Andrew Schepard & James W. Bozzomo, Efficiency, Therapeutic Justice, Mediation, 
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regime and the role of mental health professionals and nonprofessional 
court staff has become more prominent. A related development is the 
change in goals and ambitions for family court proceedings. The goal of 
granting parties legal remedies such as custody, divorce, and financial 
support has been supplanted by the goal of providing families before the 
court a "holistic assessment of the family's legal and social needs ... to 
devise more comprehensive legal remedies.,,26 
Many of these developments may hold promise for families in 
conflict who seek legal remedies to disputes. Using the legal system to 
assign fault for divorce or to resolve child access disputes using 
indeterminate standards like "best interests of the child" often results in 
flawed decisions that take too much time and, if they can afford lawyers 
and other litigation expenses, costs families too much money.27 And, as 
I have argued elsewhere, the traditional adversary system will continue 
to fail most parties as long as they are without lawyers or legal advice, 
given family law's complex system of procedural rules and broad 
discretionary standards.28 
The new paradigm offers an alternative to the flawed adversary 
system for families who must resort to the court for legal remedies. But 
important questions should be explored before we fully embrace the new 
reforms. In a system where fully half of family law litigants are 
unrepresented in court, have we . fully tested the effectiveness of the 
adversary system to resolve family conflicts?29 What values embedded 
in the adversary system must be maintained in any family justice system 
to preserve the basic procedural and substantive fairness we require of 
our legal system?30 And what impact would it have on low-income 
families to embrace some or all of the elements of the "therapeutic 
regime,,?31 Is there an alternative to the new family court's ambitious 
and Evaluation: Reflections on a Survey of Unified Family Courts, 37 FAM. L. Q. 333, 347 (2003). 
26. RESOLVING FAMILY CONFLICTS, supra note 6, at xv (quoting Babb, supra note 8, at 807). 
27. See, e.g., Schepard & Bozzomo, supra note 25, at 341 (arguing that the risks of 
"overreaching and incompetent judge[s]" in a unified family court "palen by comparison" to the "chaos 
created for families" when family disputes are resolved in the traditional adversary system); Claudia 
Wright, Representation of Children in a Unified Family Court System in Florida, U. FLA. 1.L. & PUB. 
POL'y 179,180 (2003) (claiming that troubled "families may spin from courtroom to courtroom caught 
in a process that depletes time, money, and energy, and yet never really addresses the core of the 
problem."); SCHEPARD, supra note 20, at 4 (describing why the "underlying philosophical premises [of 
the traditional adversary system] were incompatible with the needs of most children"). 
28. Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 123 
(1993). 
29. See infra note 167 and accompanying text. 
30. For an in-depth discussion of the essential elements of a legal system in a democracy see 
CHRISTOPHER 1. PETERS, A MATTER OF DISPUTE: AN ACCOUNT OF DEMOCRACY UNDER LAW 
(forthcoming 2010). 
31. See infra subpart 111.0. 
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agenda that will improve the adversary system's ability to perform its 
essential dispute resolution function? The remainder of this Article 
addresses these questions. 
III. THE CAUTIONARY TALE 
Although the dramatic shifts in family dispute resolution have been 
underway for over a decade, scholars and family policymakers have 
engaged in little critical analysis of the risks and potential negative 
consequences of such change. This subpart explores these concerns by 
examining the limits of courts' institutional competence, the surrender of 
fact-finding and decisionmaking to individuals without legal training, 
and the disjunction between alternative dispute resolution and 
established legal norms. 
A. Do Family Courts Have the "Institutional Competence" to Achieve 
the Goals of Reformers? 
Institutions called "family courts" began appearing as early as the 
1900s,32 and a Standard Family Court Act was circulating in the 1950s.33 
But the new model of a unified family court with expanded services and 
programs for both child welfare and divorce and child access cases did 
not begin to be established around the country in significant numbers 
until the 1990s.34 As a result, there is limited empirical data, positive or 
negative, of these courts' impact on the families they serve. But a few 
observations about how these courts operate in both theory and practice, 
how families experience these courts, and the impact of economics on 
that experience are possible at this time. 
32. Developments in the Law, Unified Family Courts and the Child Protection Dilemma, 116 
HARV. L. REv. 2099, 2103 (Z003); Jane M. Spinak, Adding Value to Families: The Potential of Model 
Family Courts, 2002 WIS. L. REv 331, 334-40 (2002) (providing a brief history of the family court 
movement); Jane M. Spinak, Romancing the Court. 46 FAM. CT. REV. 258, 261-62 (2008) (providing a 
history of the family courts and the changes to the family courts during the twentieth century). 
33. An Act to Establish a Family Court. Prescribing Its Jurisdiction. Powers. and Duties. and 
Regulating Procedure Therein, 5 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE ASS'N. J. 105 (\959). 
34. See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 3Z. INDIANA FAMILY CT. PROJECT, THE 
FIRST FOUR YEARS 47-58 (Z004), http://www.ai.orgljudiciary/family-court/docs/2004-report/Z004-
report. pdf; Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Frameworkfor Court Reform in Family 
Law: A Blueprint to Construct A Unified Family Court. 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 469,482-90 (\998); Unified 
Family Site Update, UNIFIED FAM. CHRON., May 1997, at I; see also Patricia O. Barnes, It May Take A 
Village . .. Or a Specialized Court to Address Family Problems, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1996, at 22. But see 
Spinak, supra note 32, at 334, 364 (providing a brief history of the family court movement and noting 
the cyclical nature of reform efforts); Boldt & Singer, supra note 19, at 91 (analyzing the new Unified 
Family Court movement as an "outgrowth of the juvenile court movement of the early twentieth 
century"). 
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Although families may benefit from the capacity-building and 
problem-solving approaches embraced in the new paradigm, most courts 
are not competent to provide these services. Court-based procedures 
have historically been designed to determine facts and enforce norms. 
The model family court movement has sought to expand this function 
with a complex, ambitious agenda to address both the legal and nonlegal 
problems of families who come before them seeking dispute resolution. 
While the goals of the court system have expanded substantially, the 
structural changes contemplated in even the ideal courts may not be 
sufficient to meet the ambitious agenda and transform courts' traditional 
functions. 35 Courts with their "limited remedial imaginations, may not 
be the best institutional settings for resolving" the nonlegal issues 
proponents wish to place within their authority.36 As a result, the 
restructured family courts may be incapable of achieving the formidable 
task of "provid[ing] coordinated holistic services ... to address the 
physical and mental needs of the family.,,37 
In addition to problems adjusting to the proposed change in goals and 
function, state court dockets, particularly the family law docket, 
continue to grow and resources continue to decline.38 Recruiting, 
35. The ideal unified family court has been defined as having the following components: (I) 
comprehensive subject-matter jurisdiction over family-related legal matters; (2) a "one family, one 
team" assignment system, designed to ensure that all matters affecting a family are handled by a single 
judge or judicial team; (3) an emphasis on interdisciplinary training and collaboration; and (4) the 
provision and coordination of a comprehensive range of court-connected family services. Catherine J. 
Ross, The Failure of Fragmentation: The Promise of a System of Unified Family Courts, 32 FAM. L.Q. 
3, 15 (1998); see also PATRICIA A. GARCIA, A.B.A., UNIFIED FAMILY COURTS: JUSTICE DELIVERED 
(2001) (summarizing the characteristics of unified family courts). 
36. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, 
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5, 7 (1996) (arguing that the current adversary system is 
inadequate for satisfying many important goals of a dispute resolution system) (internal quotations 
omitted) (footnote omitted). 
37. Anne H. Geraghty & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Unified Family Courts: Tempering Enthusiasm 
With Caution, 40 FAM. CT. REv. 435, 437 (2002). 
38. CT. STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2007: A NATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTIC PROJECT 30-37 (2008) 
http://www.ncsconline.orgID_Researchlcsp/2007_files/Examining%2OFinal%20-%202007%20-
%206%20-%20Domestic.pdf (finding a 5% increase in domestic relation case loads from 1997 to 2006 
for the states represented with a general jurisdiction and 14% increase over the same time period for 
state courts of limited jurisdiction); Connie Cass, Overflowing Dockets, Lack of Social Services 
Frustrate Foster Care Judges, MIDWEST NEWS, July I, 2004, available at http://e-
magazine.adoption.com/issue/20Jul04.html (quoting family court judges saying that because of 
overcrowded dockets "[y]ou wind up giving minutes to a case when you should give it several hours and 
you just don't have the hours to give"); Wendell Large, The Cost of Justice, 21 ME. B. J. 119 (2006) 
(discussing Maine's State Court's need for increased funding); Margery Gordon, Roadblocks to Reform, 
MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV., May 17, 2005, at I (referencing the Florida's Supreme Court warning that the 
lack of funding for a UFC system may "imperil" the efforts to create such a system). Of course, the 
economic crisis beginning in September 2009 has only increased the crisis in state court funding. See, 
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training, and retaining appropriate judicial and nonjudicial staff for the 
multiple functions contemplated or, in some cases, statutorily mandated 
in these courts would challenge even a well-financed, broadly 
committed effort. As one commentator has noted: 
The Family Court model court movement is barely five years old, and 
these courts are just beginning to realize the complexity of their 
endeavor. Reading what the courts engaged in this experiment say about 
themselves reveals a mixture of shock and optimism: shock at how hard 
change is to accomplish, and optimism after seeing real differences in 
outcomes for families and children. It is also apparent that some of their 
earliest efforts were procedurally-oriented just to get them started. 
Those steps have resulted in administrative restructuring and procedural 
mechanisms for problem-solving that can now be applied to the 
substantive mandates of the model court movement, an even harder task 
to accomplish.39 
Asking a court system to take on these tasks may detract from its 
fundamental role as a forum for fair and authoritative dispute 
resolution.4o Scarce resources would be spread even more thinly and 
some courts may have difficulty meeting both basic conflict resolution 
functions and the broader and more ambitious goals of the new family 
courtS.41 A recent study examining the impact of establishing family 
divisions in one state demonstrates the difficulty in delivering the 
promised services to more than a small percentage of litigants before the 
court.42 And, as more fully explained below, making good on the broad 
promise of reform for even a handful of parties may come at a 
e.g, State Justice Institute, State Court Budget Shortfalls, http://www.sji.gov/article-
state_court_budget.php (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) (reporting how state courts are suffering significant 
budget losses due to the recent economic situation). ELIZABETH McNICHOL & NICHOLAS JOHNSON, 
CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL'y PRIORITIES, RECESSION CONTINUES TO BATTER STATE BUDGETS; STATE 
RESPONSES COULD SLOW RECOVERY I (2010), http://www.cbpp.orgifiJes/9-8-08sfp.pdf (reporting 
forty-one states are experiencing budget shortfalls with severe fiscal problems likely to continue). 
39. Spinak, supra note 32, at 374-75. 
40. See Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 37, at 441. 
41. Id.; John Lande, How Much Justice Can We Afford?: Defining the Courts' Roles and 
Deciding the Appropriate Number of Trials, Settlement Signals, and Other Elements Needed to 
Administer Justice, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 213 (2006) (discussing the budgetary drawbacks of the 
jUdiciary system); Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1521 (1993) 
(arguing that certain judicial programs, such as ADR, which have not been shown to reduce costs, 
should be cut due to budgetary restraints). 
42. THE WOMEN'S LAW CTR. OF MD., INC., FAMILIES IN TRANSITION: A FOLLOW-UP STUDY 
EXPLORING FAMILY LAW ISSUES IN MARYLAND 49-50 (2006), 
http://www.wlcmd.orglpdf/FamiliesinTransition.pdf (finding the Family Division did not provide 
evaluative services in 75% of the cases involving child custody and that Maryland should develop and 
implement a tracking system for services provided to family law litigants to ensure greater allocation of 
services). 
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substantial cost to long held values of due process, family privacy, and 
autonomy. 
B. The Surrender of Fact-Finding and Decisionmaking to Nonlawyers 
The new paradigm for family law decisionmaking contemplates a 
substantial change in the roles of lawyers and judges. Some 
commentators see a different, but expanded, role for these players in the 
new system.43 But most commentary and much of the change already 
implemented endorses the significantly expanded role of nonlegal staff 
rather than lawyers in the new family court. Such staff "manage cases," 
provide court-connected services, and assist fact finders and 
decisionmakers in reaching settlements or decisions.44 One family court 
proponent has described the need for an expanded role for these new 
players in the system to provide: 
[A] high level of administrative organization both to manage cases and to 
coordinate services. The court management system, including nonjudicial 
personnel, must aim to resolve disputes in a timely manner, to supply and 
to coordinate efficiently the necessary resources or services, and to 
network appropriately with other courts in the system to share 
information about families that allows for consistent judicial 
d .. k' 45 eClslOnma mg. 
Nonlegal and, in many instances, nonprofessional staff have always 
exercised enormous influence on the outcome of child welfare 
proceedings where the state has intervened after allegations of child 
abuse or neglect.46 But the role of such staff, particularly case managers 
and mediators, has expanded in both child protection and divorce and 
43. Andrew Schepard and Forest Mosten see an expanded role for lawyers under the new 
paradigm. See SCHEPARD, supra note 20, at 125-37; Forrest S. Mosten, Emerging Roles of the Family 
Lawyer: A Challenge for the Courts, 33 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 213, 213-33 (1995). These 
commentators include the following tasks for lawyers in an "enlightened" family justice system: "pro se 
coach," dispute resolution manager", :consultant during mediation", and "preventative legal health care 
provider." [d. Although there are efforts underway to improve legal education to prepare lawyers for 
such roles, lawyers receive little training in tasks such as counseling those experiencing emotional 
problems or acting as financial advisor. See, e.g., Jennifer Rosato, Reforming a Traditional Family Law 
Professor,44 FAM. CT. REv. 590 (2006). 
44. Babb, supra note 34, at 521. 
45. [d. 
46. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from 
Welfare "Reform," Family and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 688, 707 (1998) (concluding that 
child protective service workers who may have little or no experience or specialized education make 
most of the decisions in this arena. "These workers make largely discretionary judgments about bad 
mothering and their underlying assumptions are, for the most part, unexamined and unchallenged. 
Conversations with workers reveal a deep bias about bad mothering based on race, class, and poverty."). 
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child access proceedings in the new model courts. In tenns of child 
protection cases, expanded use of nonlegal personnel can be attributed to 
two trends prevalent in such courts. First, there has always been "a 
subtle dynamic" that: 
arises on a day-to-day level in these cases, due in part to the prevalence of 
social work discourse and the tendency of the participants to view these 
cases in therapeutic rather than legalistic terms. This dynamic implicitly 
suppresses rights talk and discourages the participants from taking 
advantage of those procedural protections that do exist.47 
Second, the family court movement has contributed to the expansion 
of infonnal, nonadversarial alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in 
child welfare cases.48 As a result, social workers, child protection staff, 
and other nonlegal actors playa central role in decisions about removal 
and placement of children where abuse or neglect is alleged. As 
discussed more fully in subpart III.D infra, the danger for families, 
primarily poor, involved in these proceedings is that disregard for 
statutory and constitutional nonns will result in extensive state 
involvement in family life by nonjudicial personnel before any judicial 
detennination of abuse or neglect justifying such involvement. And 
decisions will be made in infonnal settings based on the evaluations, 
however flawed, of staff with few standards guiding these decisions and 
little or no opportunity for review. 
The model family court has also expanded the role of nonlawyers in 
private family disputes where the state is not a party, particularly those 
involving divorce, child custody, and visitation. The nonlegal personnel 
in these cases include expanded roles for professional staff drawn from 
mental health and social work backgrounds with relatively established 
roles such as mediators and custody evaluators.49 They also include 
staff with new titles and somewhat less established roles such as 
"parenting coordinators,"So "early neutral evaluators,,,SI and "family law 
47. Amy Sinden, "Why Won't Mom Cooperate? ": A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare 
Proceedings, II YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 343-44 (1999). 
48. Lisa Merkel-Holguin, Sharing Power with the People: Family Group Conferencing as a 
Democratic Experiment, 31 J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 155 (2004). 
49. Mary Kay Kisthardt & Barbara Glesner Fines, Making a Place at the Table: 
Reconceptualizing the Role of the Custody Evaluator in Child Custody Disputes 43 FAM. CT. REv. 229 
(2005). For a discussion of the "elements" of custody evaluation in one jurisdiction, see Jeanne Allegra, 
Elements of Custody, FAMILY L. NEW 12, 13 (February 2009) (describing her job as "making 
recommendations about custody/visitation . . . when at least one litigant questions the other's 
psychological stability and therefore, ability to be an effective parent."). 
50. Christine A. Coates et aI., Parenting Coordination For High-Conflict Families, 42 FAM.CT. 
REv. 246 (2004); Jacqueline W. Silbermann, Child Custody in Contested Matrimonials, 80 N.Y. ST. 
B.J., Jan. 2008, at 16, 17. 
51. See, e.g., Jordan Santeramo, Student Note, Early Neutral Evaluation in Divorce Cases, 42 
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facilitators."s2 Finally, the new family court, at least as experienced in 
some court systems, continues a pattern well entrenched in its 
predecessor courts, of vesting enonnous power in nonprofessional staff 
such as clerks, custody investigators, case managers, and, in many cases, 
mediators.s3 
As early as the late 1980s, a few commentators were beginning to 
recognize the shift in both the rhetoric and decisionmaking in family 
disputes, particularly in the child access area. Martha Fineman, in an 
early and much cited article,s4 noted that the "professional language of 
the social workers and mediators has progressed to become the public, 
then the political, then the dominant rhetoric. It now defines the tenns 
of contemporary discussions about custody and effectively excludes or 
minimizes contrary ideologies and concepts."ss She attributed this shift, 
in part, to the willingness of judges and lawyers to cede authority 
because of their feelings of inadequacy to make judgments about the 
best interests of children-the existing legal standard in child custody 
decisions.56 
Recognizing the problems associated with leaving child access cases 
to an adversarial system making decisions under a best interests 
standard, Professor Fineman nonetheless cautioned against "turn[ing] 
over the decisionmaking task to another professional groUp."S7 Though 
these nonlegal professionals are considered neutral, in her view, they 
have a bias in favor of joint custody, regardless of the case's 
circumstances.58 Judicial deference to agreements or recommendations 
from these processes poses risks to primary parents and their children. 
FAM. CT. REv. 321 (2004); Janet R. Johnston, Building Multidisciplinary Professional Partnerships with 
the Court on Behalf of High-conflict Divorcing Families and their Children: Who Needs What Kind of 
Help?, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 453 (2000). 
52. Deborah J. Chase, Pro Se Justice and Unified Family Courts, 37 FAM. L.Q. 403, 422 (2003). 
53. Timothy Lohmar et aI., Student Projects a Survey of Domestic Mediator Qualifications and 
Suggestions For a Uniform Paradigm, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL. 217, 218 (1998); Joan 8. Kelly & Janet R. 
Johnston, Commentary on Tippins and Wittmann's "Empirical and Ethical Problems with Custody 
Recommendations: A Calif or Clinical Humility and Judicial Vigilance",43 FAM. CT. REv. 233 (200S); 
54. Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child 
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727 (1988). 
55. Id. at 730. 
56. Id. at 740. 
57. Id. at 729. 
58. Id. at 730-31. (,,[Slocial workers and other members of the helping professions ... present 
themselves as neutral, nonadversarial decisionrnakers in contrast to attorneys, whom they characterize as 
both adversarial and combative. Yet social workers are not neutral; they have a professional bias in 
favor of a specific substantive result. That result benefits their profession by creating the need for 
mediation and counseling. It is this bias and self-interest that makes the process one for political 
consideration. The bias inherent in mediation is different from, but no less suspect than, the bias that 
can result from overt favoritism of one party over another."). 
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Instead, she argued for a return to a legal model in custody cases that 
protects and recognizes the role of the parent assuming care for the child 
and proposed the "primary parent" rule to implement this goa1.59 
Other more recent critiques of growing reliance on nonlegal personnel 
to make custody decisions raise concerns about the bases for such 
"expert" opinions. Tippins and Whitman, a family law attorney and a 
psychologist, argue that while forensic psychological assessments60 are 
often "pivotal documents" that form the basis of judicial decisions on 
child access, they fail to meet ethical and scientific standards of both 
psychology and law: 
Indeed, there is probably no forensic question on which overreaching by 
mental health professionals has been so common and so egregious. 
Besides lacking scientific validity, such opinions have often been based 
on clinical data that are, on their face, irrelevant to the legal questions in 
dispute. Indeed, whatever position one might take on the ultimate issue 
rule with respect to other species of expert testimony, such opinions by 
mental health witnesses on the ultimate question of a child's best interest 
ought not to be allowed. . .. The best interests standard is a legal and 
socio-moral construct, not a psychological construct. There is no 
empirically supportable method or principle by which an evaluator can 
come to a conclusion with respect to best interests entirely by resort to the 
knowledge base of the mental health profession.61 
59. Id. at 770-74. For further discussion of this idea of a "primary caretaker standard," see infra 
notes 152-53 and accompanying text. See also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Search for Guidance in 
Determining the Best Interests of the Child at Divorce: Reconciling the Primary Caretaker and Joint 
Custody Preferences, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 1,37 (1985); Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent 
Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3Y ALE L. & POL'y REv. 168, 180-82 (1984) (arguing 
for a presumptive rule in favor of the primary caretaker); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d. 357, 363 (W. 
Va. 1981). Garska has been modified by recent statutory changes in West Virginia that continue to 
instruct judges to allocate custodial responsibility for children based upon past caretaking 
responsibilities, but do not create a presumption in favor of the primary caretaker. See W. VA. CODE 
§ 48-9-206 (2008) (directing the court to take into account the past caretaking responsibilities when 
deciding custody sharing instead of solely on past responsibilities); John D. Athey, The Ramifications of 
West Virginia's Codified Child Custody Law: A Departure from Garska v. McCoy, 106 W. VA. L. REv. 
389 (2004). For a full discussion of the merits of the primary caretaker rule, see David L. Chambers, 
Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH L. REV. 477, 527-38 (1984) 
(recommending a rule favoring the primary caretaker for children five and under). As discussed infra at 
note 155, the ALI Principles have created some renewed interest in this approach to custody decision 
making. No state expressly follows a primary caretaker presumption today. A number of states weigh 
findings about who is the primary caretaker as a factor in child custody determinations. See, e.g., 
Michigan Child Custody Act of 1970, MICH. COMPo LAWS § 722.23 (2009). In other states, the primary 
caretaker inquiry is a creature of common law. Kjelland v. Kjelland, 609 N.W.2d 100 (N.D. 2000). 
60. Matthew T. Huss, What is Forensic Psychology? It's Not Silence of the Lambs!, EYE ON PSI 
CHI, Spring 2001, http://www.psichi.orglpubs/articles/article_58.asp (defining forensic psychology as 
the intersection of mental health and the law through the practice of clinical psychology). 
61. Timothy M. Tippins & Jeffrey P. Wittmann, Empirical and Ethical Problems with Custody 
Recommendations: A Callfor Clinical Humility and Judicial Vigilance, 43 FAM. Cr. REv. 193,214-15 
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Others have noted that this critique can also be applied, perhaps more 
forcefully, to the range of nonlegal and nonprofessional staff who often 
conduct custody investigations and assist courts in reaching custody 
decisions: 
[C]ustody evaluators are more likely to make inferences and 
recommendations from unsubstantiated theory, personal values and 
experiences, and cultural and personal biases. Our own observations and 
reviews of evaluations over several decades lead us to the same 
conclusion. Common examples include unexamined strong beliefs in the 
primacy of mothers (or essentiality of fathers) regardless of the 
circumstances, biased perception of their clients derived from their own 
negative marital and divorce experiences, or a conviction that joint 
physical custody benefits (or harms) all children.62 
Criticism of increased reliance on nonjudicial personnel also stems 
from the often unclear ethical standards that govern such personnel's 
behavior. While nonlawyer mediators may be bound by court rules or 
statutes requiring mediator confidentiality, prohibiting testimony in 
court, or ex parte contacts with judges about mediation sessions,63 not all 
states have such rules. Indeed, some state statutes authorize mediators 
to make recommendations to the court if mediation fails.64 The ethical 
obligations of staff with roles such as "custody evaluators" or "parenting 
coordinators" are even less clear. Commentators have raised concerns 
about the practices of such staff in both obtaining information about 
parties and sharing such information with judges and others.65 These 
concerns exist when parties are represented by counsel and court 
personnel do not appropriately consult with counsel before giving 
"advice" to parties or seeking information from them66 These concerns 
are even greater when parties are unrepresented and have little 
understanding of the relative authority of various players in the family 
court system.67 
(2005) (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted). 
62. Kelly & Johnston, supra note 53, at 233; see also Kisthardt & Fines, supra note 49, at 229-
32; Nancy Ver Steegh & Clare Dalton, Report from the Wingspread Conference of Domestic Violence 
and Family Courts, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 454, 461 (2008) (noting the wide range of education and training 
among court personnel screening family cases for mediation and other services). 
63. See. e.g., MD. R. PROC. § 17-109; GA. SUP. CT. MEDIATION R. 7(a}-{b); PA. R. CIV. PRO. 
1940.2; U.S. DIST. CT. R. W.O. VA. 83. 
64. See, e.g., CAL. ALAMEDA CTY. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 10.1.11; Caroline Harris Crowne, The 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998: Implementing a New Paradigm of Justice, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 1768,1803 (2001). 
65. See Merkel-Holguin, supra note 48, at 161. 
66. Chase, supra note 52, at 423. 
67. Id. 
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C. The Disjunction Between Alternative Dispute Resolution and Legal 
Norms 
A centerpiece of the new paradigm in family decisionmaking is the 
expanded use of alternative dispute resolution and, in particular, 
mediation. The use of mediation in divorce and related child access 
disputes is relatively established but has grown exponentially as court-
mandated family mediation has spread in the new family courtS.68 Most 
recently, use of mediation or "family conferencing" has spread into child 
welfare cases.69 Encouraged by judges and court administrators who 
welcome both the reduction of cases on their dockets and relief from 
making difficult child placement decisions, mediation continues to grow 
throughout the family court system. 
It is difficult to underestimate the sea change in family dispute 
resolution when moving from the courtroom to the mediation room. 
Like many of the reforms, mediation presents both possibilities and risks 
as an alternative to a legal system suffused with the norms of traditional 
advocacy. There is no fact finder or decision maker apart from the 
parties in mediation. Rather, a mediator "facilitates" the parties in 
resolving their own disputes.?O Mediating parties "may address any 
issue they wish, not limited to legal causes of action; they may bring in 
any information they wish, not limited by rules of evidence and 
procedure to probative evidence, relevant to legal causes of action and 
meeting evidentiary requirements for authenticity and accuracy."? 1 
Even in court-based programs, the sessions are private and informal with 
few rules governing the scope of discussions or exchange of 
information, other than mediator-developed rules of courtesy. Legal 
norms play a very limited role. While laws regarding child support 
formula may be mentioned, in mediation of child access issues, and to 
some extent, marital property and alimony, parties are encouraged to 
generate their own norms that guide the resolution to their dispute.72 
In appropriate cases, mediation can empower parties, enhance their 
ability to work together in the future, and promote flexible and creative 
68. DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 3-22 (Jay 
Folberg et al. eds., 2004); see also JANE C. MURPHY & ROBERT RUBINSON, FAMILY MEDIATION: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 10-12 (2009). 
69. See Merkel-Holguin, supra note 48. 
70. See. e.g.. MURPHY & RUBINSON, supra note 68, at 12. 
71. Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, If Portia Were A Mediator: An Inquiry Into Justice in 
Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 157, 161 (2002). 
72. Ellen A. Waldman, IdentifYing the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model 
Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 708 (1997); Donald T. Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empowerment-
And of Mediator Activism, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 50 I, 534 (1997). 
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problem-solving. It has particular value in family disputes where 
strengthening, rather than harming relationships in the dispute resolution 
process is important because of the need for ongoing relationships to co-
parent children after family breakup.73 But participation in mediation 
also poses a serious risk that parties may waive important legal rights or 
enter agreements that exacerbate conflict. This is particularly true when 
mediators are ill-equipped or poorly trained.74 Bad mediators can do 
great harm--especially to vulnerable parties-when the "empowering" 
promise of mediation can instead become an exercise in coercion and 
arm-twisting. 75 This risk is particularly acute without appellate review, 
a public record, or established grievance procedures that, at least in 
theory, provide a check on the risk of "bad" judging. 
The risks of mediation increase when parties are encouraged or 
ordered to participate in mediation and lack information about legal 
norms. Attorneys have not traditionally played a central role in 
mediation. Unless confronted with a court order for mediation, 
attorneys rarely mention mediation as an option for clients facing family 
breakup, either through divorce or child welfare proceedings.76 
Although some quickly recognized the important role attorneys can play 
in both preparing clients for mediation, and in the mediation sessions 
themselves,77 the prevailing view is that attorneys have little or no role 
to play in mediation. 78 Some proponents of mediation not only see 
73. Ann Milne, Mediation-A Promising Alternativefor Family Courts, 42 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 
61 (\991) (arguing that mediation is particularly well-suited to resolving disputes among family 
members because agreements, rather than a public adversarial proceeding, are less destructive to family 
relationships, particularly parent-child ties). 
74. KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 429-78 (1994). 
75. For a discussion of the damage that poor mediators can wreak in family law mediation, see, 
for example, Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, I 00 YALE L. J. 
1545, 1603 (\ 991); Penelope Eileen Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: the Lawyer's Role in Divorce 
Mediation, 28 FAM. L. Q. 177 (1994). For a rare instance where an alleged bad mediator was subjected 
to judicial scrutiny, albeit unsuccessfully, see Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Tex. 1998) 
(plaintiffs alleged that mediator coerced settlement). 
76. In response to this concern, the American Bar Association added language to its Comments 
to Model Rule 2.1 Scope of Advice suggesting that lawyers may be obligated to advise clients about the 
availability of alternative dispute resolution. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 5 
(2002) (noting that "when a matter is likely to involve litigation, it may be necessary ... to inform the 
client of forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation."). 
77. Craig A. McEwen et aI., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to 
Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1317 (1995) (analyzing a study oflawyer 
participation in divorce mediation in Maine and concluding that such participation protects clients and 
otherwise improves the quality of the mediation process). 
78. Mark C. Rutherford, Lawyers and Divorce Mediation: Designing The Role of "Outside 
Counsel", 12 MEDIATION Q., June 1986, at 17,27 ("For mediation to succeed as a profession and to 
reach its highest objectives, advocacy has no place in any part of the process. For outside counsel to 
advocate a client's interests contradicts the very essence of mediation and can produce inequitable 
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attorneys as having a limited role, but actively discourage their 
participation. Without rules of procedure and evidence or governing 
substantive law they argue, parties can navigate the process of mediation 
themselves. Attorneys have little or no role under this conception of 
family mediation. 
But the risk of loss of rights in the mediation process is significantly 
greater for unrepresented parties.79 Even if the attorney does not attend 
the mediation, the represented party has far greater access to an expert 
source of information about judicial proceedings, each party's legal 
rights and remedies, and the parties' chances of success in court. The 
unrepresented party has no comparable source of information when a 
"neutral" mediator facilitates an agreement. One scholar described his 
view of the potential harm for unrepresented litigants in court-sponsored 
mediation programs: 
From a mediator's point of view, the [neutral role of mediator] flows 
naturally from the concept of mediation, a process voluntarily selected 
by the parties as a means of dispute resolution different from an 
adversarial trial. From an unrepresented litigant's point of view, 
however, the effect of the rules can be devastating. The pressure exerted 
by courts to send cases to mediation and the lack of explanation of the 
mediation process raise serious questions about the "voluntary" nature 
of the decision to mediate. Once in mediation, the pressures on 
mediators to obtain settlements are immense. With a large number of 
unrepresented litigants, this pressure guarantees that mediators will 
rarely, if ever, exercise the option to terminate the mediation due to the 
incapacity of an unrepresented litigant to participate. . .. In mediated 
settlements, the routine waiver of rights by unrepresented litigants flows 
from presumptions that the choice to mediate is voluntary and informed; 
that the litigant has a realistic opportunity to obtain counsel and chooses 
to forego counsel; that the litigant has access to independent advice; and 
that the litigant appears in mediation aware of her legal rights and 
capable of participating in mediation .... In theory, judges could 
provide a check on the dangers identified above in mediation, because 
mediated agreements are usually sent to them for approval. In reality, 
judges typically rubber-stamp agreements reached in mediation.8o 
results."); see UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 10 (2001); see also MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR 
FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION 3 (2000), available at http://www.afccnet.orglpdfs/ 
modelstandards.pdf. 
79. For a discussion of the substantial numbers of unrepresented parties in family court cases, see 
infra notes 96, 123, and 126. 
80. Russell Engler, And Justice For All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: ReviSiting the Roles 
a/the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1987,2010-11 (1999) (footnotes omitted) 
(arguing for changing the role of mediator when one or both parties are unrepresented to include 
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The risks of mediation are also heightened when one party is less 
powerful than the other.81 Lack of formal procedures; confidential, 
private setting; focus on the parties' "needs" rather than "rights" under 
substantive family law; and virtual lack of review of both the process 
and outcome of mediation create a setting where the more powerful may 
dominate, and bias and prejudice are unchecked.82 Power imbalances 
may exist where only one party is represented by an attorney or may 
result from race, gender, class, sexual orientation, and cultural 
differences in mediation.83 
The most disabling power imbalance in mediation may be where 
domestic violence has taken place. In these cases, there has already 
been a severe abuse of power and the consequent power imbalance can 
make mediation impossible. A consensus has emerged that cases 
involving family violence need special treatment in mediation, reflected 
in both standards for mediators84 and mediation statutes and rules.85 
providing legal information); see also Waldman, supra note 72 (proposing a "norm educating" or even 
"norm advocating" role for mediators in some situations, including certain types of family mediation). 
But the vast majority of mediators reject such a role. See e.g., Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why 
Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937 (1997). 
81. One of the earliest articulations of this position is the often-cited article by Trina Grillo, 
supra note 75. Of course, some mediators argue that just opposite is true: mediation is particularly 
appropriate for relationships marked by power imbalances, particularly gender. They argue that 
the hierarchical, "winner takes all" approach of a still white, male dominated adversary system further 
disempowers and silences the less powerful. The delays, expense, complexity, and inflexibility of 
litigation make it particularly well-suited to resolving family law disputes. Mediation, on the other 
hand, with its emphasis on listening, relationships, and problem-solving has greater potential to "heal" 
and "hear" all voices. Further, mediation's focus on permitting participants to express emotions and 
articulate needs may be better suited to women than men. Its procedural informality, lack of reliance on 
substantive rules of law, and lower cost might make it more accessible to those who cannot afford 
lawyers and are not well versed in the American justice system. See, e.g., Jonathan Lippman, Achieving 
Better Outcomes for Litigants in the New York State Courts, 34 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 813,815 (2007); 
Anne K. Suboume, Motivations for Mediation: An Examination of the Philosophies Governing Divorce 
Mediation in the International Context, 38 TEX.INT'L L.J. 381, 382-83 (2002); James R. Holbrook, The 
Effects of Alternative Dispute Resolution On Access to Justice in Utah, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 1017, 1021-
25 (2006); Robert E. Emery et aI., Divorce Mediation: Research and Reflections, 43 FAM. CT. REv. 22, 
22-37 (2005). Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, What Role Does Gender Play in Mediation of Domestic 
Relations Cases?, 86 JUDICATURE 134 (2002). 
82. Michael Lang, Understanding and Responding to Power in Mediation, in DIVORCE AND 
F AMIL Y MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND ApPLICATIONS supra note 68, at 209, 213-15. 
83. Richard Delgado et aI., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1985). 
84. The Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation, endorsed by among 
others, the American Bar Association and the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, include 
provisions defining domestic violence, requiring domestic violence training for mediators, screening, 
and setting forth steps to ensure safety during mediation. Model Standards of Practice for Family and 
Divorce Mediation, 39 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 121, 127 (2001). The Model Standards also 
recognize that some cases should not be mediated "because of safety, control, or intimidation issues." 
Id. at 132. "A mediator should make a reasonable effort to screen for the existence of domestic abuse 
prior to entering into an agreement to mediate. The mediator should continue to assess for domestic 
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Despite this consensus, there is evidence that the new family courts, in 
which mediation plays such a central role, still order couples who have 
experienced domestic violence to mediate family law disputes with little 
or no particularized examination of the couples' circumstances.86 
Perhaps an even more troubling example of risks posed by mediation 
in the face of a disabling power imbalance is family conferencing in 
child welfare cases. While these cases may involve more attorneys than 
private family disputes,87 the attorneys' role in family conferencing is as 
ill-defined and limited as in divorce and custody mediations.88 And 
these cases are often marked by intimate partner violence89 and parties 
with limited education and resources.90 All these circumstances create 
risks that a parent, most often the mother, will "suppress[] her point of 
view in order to achieve agreement," and not benefit from available 
statutory or constitutional protections.91 As Amy Sinden has described: 
[I]nformal procedures are unlikely overall to be as successful as formal 
ones in meeting the outcome and process goals of due process. The 
substantial power disparity between the parties, the emotionally charged 
nature of the subject matter, and the lack of a shared set of interests and 
values between the parties all tend to distort the decision making process. 
Traditional formal adversarial processes have mechanisms that, while far 
from perfect, are designed to combat the distortion caused by such 
abuse throughout the mediation process." Id. Another group of distinguished academics, judges and 
practicing lawyers, the American Law Institute (ALI), has also addressed mediating family disputes 
where domestic violence is present. In its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, the ALI takes 
the position that the risks of coercion and intimidation in mediation for victims of domestic violence 
require that all mediation programs be voluntary. AM. LAW INST., supra note 5, § 2.07(2). 
85. Courts and legislatures have responded to the consensus that domestic violence cases should 
be given special treatment in mediation by enacting a variety of rules and statutes to achieve that goal. 
As of 2004, forty two states had enacted statewide statutes or court rules authorizing mandatory, 
discretionary, or voluntary court-sponsored mediation programs of selected family law disputes. Of the 
forty-two statutes or rules, twenty-nine create some kind of exception to the court's authority. Jane C. 
Murphy & Robert Rubinson, Domestic Violence and Mediation: Responding to the Challenges 0/ 
Creating Effective Screens, 39 F AM. L.Q. 53 (2005). 
86. Id. (citing studies in California and Maryland's Family Courts in which large numbers of 
cases involving family violence go to family mediation without being identified and properly screened). 
But see id. at 62-63 (report identifying new procedures for court screening of domestic violence cases 
prior to referral for court-sponsored mediation in Maryland's family divisions). 
87. See, e.g,. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 1-202 (Lexis Nexis 2009); S.c. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
110 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30: 4C-15.4 (West 2009) (example of statutes providing representation of 
parents and children in child abuse and neglect cases). 
88. Mary Kay Kisthardt, Working in the Best Interest o/Children: Facilitating the Collaboration 
0/ Lawyers and Social Workers in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 30 RUTGERS L. REc. 1 (2006). 
89. Murphy, supra note 46, at 711. 
90. Id. 
91. Sinden, supra note 47, at 391. 
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conditions. But informality generally offers no equivalent protections.92 
Much of the research evaluating the concerns raised here about 
mediation is conflicting. The research addressing these concerns in 
family mediation tends to show different results depending on a number 
of factors including the type of issues mediated (custody or financial 
issues), whether process or outcomes are examined, and whether the 
parties have experienced both litigation and mediation.93 One difficulty 
in evaluating family mediation is measuring "success.,,94 Given 
mediation's focus on "needs" rather than "rights," measuring participant 
"satisfaction" has been the dominant and appropriate measure of 
success. Minorities and other traditionally less powerful groups may, 
however, have lower expectations about how well their needs can be 
met, thus rendering "satisfaction" an inadequate measure for these 
individuals. "Fairness" in both process and outcome instead of 
"satisfaction" should also factor into the "success" of these new forms of 
alternative dispute resolution in child welfare cases. 
D. The Impact of the New Paradigm on Low-Income Families 
1. The Loss of Legal Rights and Privacy 
The previous subparts have discussed a range of concerns about the 
move from the adversary system to "therapeutic" intervention in family 
law. Many of the elements of the new paradigm--compulsory 
mediation of disputes, reliance on nonlegal staff, and relaxation of 
procedural protections-pose greater risks for poor people. First, there 
is a risk that the new approach will deprive poor litigants of their legal 
rights. This risk results from many circumstances. First, these 
procedures and investigations are largely informal and lack the 
safeguards built into the adversary system.95 The threat of loss of rights 
is heightened for poor litigants who most often appear without lawyers 
and therefore lack the protection afforded by lawyers in this unchartered 
territory.96 Further, there is evidence that when these services are 
92. Id. 
93. Id. For a summary of some of the research regarding gender and mediation, see DIVORCE 
AND FAMILY MEDIA nON: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICA nONS, supra note 68, at 456-57. 
94. Waldman, supra note 72, at 765 (finding that the difficulty in measuring "success" is in part 
because different mediation models place "a different weight and emphasis on the values of fairness, 
disputant autonomy, social justice, and self-determination"). 
95. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
96. See generally Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin, Legal Services for the Poor: Access. Self-
Interest. and Pro Bono, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE: SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME, LAW, AND DEVIANCE (Rebecca 
L. Sandefur ed., 2009) (finding that more than half of family law litigants are unrepresented); Steven K. 
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offered in courts without cost to the indigent, the quality of the mediator 
or evaluator is inferior to the services available for fees in a private 
setting.97 
The most troubling impact on the poor of the new approach to family 
dispute resolution is the increased loss of family privacy that results 
from the family court's expanded role. When family disputes are 
viewed as opportunities for therapeutic and holistic interventions,98 
increased state interference in family life is inevitable. While this is a 
potential risk for all parties before the court, poor families are most 
vulnerable. 
Low-income families, particularly mothers, have always been at risk 
of unjustified or inappropriate state intrusion in the child welfare.99 
Decisions in this context have been made in infonnal proceedings under 
vague standards IOo with resulting limited judicial review. These 
circumstances, combined with state and federal statutes requiring 
continuing review and oversight by the court and child welfare 
Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in Response to the Burdens Created 
by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L. J. 105, 107-17 (2001) (at least one 
spouse appearing pro se in 67% of domestic relations cases and 40% of child custody cases); Connie J. 
A. Beck & Bruce D. Sales, A Critical Reappraisal of Divorce Mediation Research and Policy. 6 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 989, 993 (2000) (72% of domestic relations cases involved at least one 
unrepresented party). 
97. Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89 (2005). There is 
growing concern about the risk that mediation will become justice "on the cheap" for the poor. While 
the "second class" justice concerns usually focus on court-ordered mediation versus litigation, there is 
growing concern that vast differences in quality may develop between private, voluntary mediation and 
public, court ordered mediation. To the extent parties have resources, they will tend to choose their own 
mediators and opt out of court-based programs. The remaining cases sent to mediation from the ever 
expanding family law docket will be predominately poor, unrepresented litigants who have no choices 
and will experience the mediation equivalent of the "mass justice" oflow-income courts. See also Carol 
J. King, Burdening Access To Justice: The Cost of Divorce Mediation On The Cheap, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. 
REv. 375 (1999); Craig A. McEwen & Laura Williams, Legal Policy and Access to Justice Through 
Courts and Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 865 (1998). The problem with the education and 
training of these nonlegal court personnel is discussed infra at note 158. 
98. See Ross, supra note 35, at 13. 
99. Murphy, supra note 46, at 707--09 (analyzing the treatment of mothers in a range of legal 
proceedings involving children and noting "[B]ecause mothers overwhelmingly are the custodians and 
caretakers of children, they are, in most cases, the focus of the state's intervention in cases of allegations 
of child abuse or neglect. As noted, from their inception, child welfare programs focused on poor 
children."). 
100. Although there is variation among standards for state intervention, the language of state 
statutes generally allows intervention based on abandonment; physical, sexual, or emotional "abuse"; or 
failure to protect a child from abuse or educational or medical neglect. See. e.g.. CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 270-271 (West 2009); D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(ii) (2009) (defining a neglected child as one "who 
is without proper parental care or control ... necessary for his or her physical, mental, or emotional 
health"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39 (2009); N.M. STAT. 32A-4-2 (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, 
§ 4912 (2009). 
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bureaucracy,IOI have led to well-documented victimization of poor 
women under this system. 102 The family court movement's increased 
reliance on informal procedures like family group conferencingl03 
increases the risk of unchecked state intervention, and threatens due 
process in these cases. One practitioner described these new procedures 
for resolving allegations of child abuse and neglect: 
[I]nfonnal processes replace the initial factual adjudication of whether 
acts of abuse or neglect warranting state intervention actually occurred 
with a free-ranging family therapy session. There is virtually no limit on 
the topics that can be discussed nor on the people who may be invited to 
join. Mediation programs typically give discretion to the mediator to 
invite people who are not parties to the case, including foster parents, 
extended family members, and members of the "community," such as a 
local church pastor. Once these people are brought to the table, all 
become equal participants, entitled to have their "concerns" heard and 
their "needs" met. Rather than seeking to detennine the truth of the 
allegations of abuse or neglect, the focus of the discussion becomes 
"[f1inding solutions which meet the competing needs and interests of all 
parties." Suddenly, the needs and interests of foster parents, aunts, 
uncles, grandparents, and social workers are placed on an equal footing 
with those of the parents and children. 
But before the family is forced to participate in therapy, the process 
is supposed to first make a determination as to whether state intervention 
is warranted. This stage has been skipped. In essence, the mediation 
session becomes the very state intrusion that the proceeding is supposed 
to determine whether or not to allow in the first place. 104 
The new regime is raising similar concerns for low-income families in 
proceedings involving divorce and child access. The risk of due process 
violations and loss of privacy in family life has increased under the new 
system with more ambitious goals for intervention and the roles of both 
judges and nonjudicial personnel have changed. As noted, a principle 
component of the new family court is the goal of having one judge hear 
all matters involving a single family.105 This may result in both more 
informed and more efficient decisionmaking. 106 But it may also result in 
101. Jane C. Murphy, Protecting Children by Preserving Parenthood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 969, 973-74 (2006). 
102. Id. at 974-75; see also Murphy, supra note 46, at 764-65; Morgan B. Ward Doran & 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Families in the Child Welfare System, 61 MD. L. REv. 386 
(2002). 
103. See, e.g., Merkel-Holguin, supra note 48. 
104. Sinden, supra note 47, at 393 (footnotes omitted) (second alteration in original). 
105. Ross, supra note 35, at 17. 
106. Gloria Danziger, Delinquency Jurisdiction in a Unified Family Court: Balancing 
Intervention, Prevention, and Adjudication, 37 F AM. L.Q. 381,394 (2003). 
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judges having access to information about a family that would be 
inadmissible in traditional adversarial proceedings. Judges might also 
reach decisions in one proceeding based upon conclusions reached in 
another. 107 In addition, a judge's role in the new "problem-solving" 
family court has shifted from the more narrow role of resolving disputes 
to the less defined, and potentially broader, role of using the court's 
authority "to motivate individuals to accept needed services and to 
monitor [the parties']compliance and progress."IOS The latter role 
creates a greater risk of unwarranted intervention in traditionally private 
spheres of family life. 
In addition to the risk of loss of privacy and due process posed by 
judges in the new family courts, the wide range of nonjudicial court-
sponsored actors and services in these courts pose similar risks. Given 
the goal of addressing both the perceived legal and nonlegal needs of 
families, parties seeking remedies like divorce or child support may be 
required to comply with orders or referrals for parenting classes, 109 
substance abuse or mental health evaluations, I 10 custody evaluations, III 
family mediation, 112 and other similar "services." 
Many commentators and practitioners have described bias in the legal 
system against the poor, particularly in their roles as parents. l13 This 
may trigger greater scrutiny and intrusion of the kind embraced by this 
regime-required attendance at parenting education, mental health 
evaluations, continuing oversight by parenting coordinators, custody 
evaluators, and other newly created players in the family justice system. 
The requirement that family members participate in services may even 
extend to victims of domestic violence seeking protection and other 
legal remedies in a family court focused on "problem solving.,,114 To 
avoid "losing sight of the victim," many of these courts include the 
107. Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 37, at 439. 
lOS. Boldt & Singer, supra note 19, at 96 (quoting Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J.1055, 1060 (2003». 
109. See e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 7-103.2 (LexisNexis 2009); Alicia M. Hehr, A Child 
Shall Lead Them: Developing and Utilizing Child Protection Mediation to Beller Serve the Interests of 
the Child, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 443, 455 (2007). 
110. See e.g., MD. R. 16-204. 
III. /d. 
112. MD. R. 9-205. 
113. See also, NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES (1997) (arguing that 
there is an inherent bias against poor and single parent families in the legal system). 
114. Joan Zorza, Specialty and Problem Solving Courts, II DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPT. 33,47-
48, (critiquing the intrusion and burdens on battered women in the Family Violence Court); Lowell D. 
Castleton, et aI., ADA County Family Violence Court: Shaping the Means to Beller the Result, 39 FAM. 
L.Q. 27 (2005). 
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battered parent in orders for counseling and other services. I 15 "Services" 
in these contexts require significant disclosure of personal information 
by family members with few rules or procedures to protect the scope of 
the information sought or, in some instances, the limits of its 
dissemination. In some cases, such orders may even undermine the 
goals of family safety as in the domestic violence context where a 
batterer may continue control over the victim by bringing contempt 
actions or otherwise using court orders for victim services as a way to 
manipulate the victim. 116 For all these reasons, court ordered 
participation in these programs burdens families' privacy and 
encroaches upon their autonomy. 
Those with resources have opportunities to limit court involvement in 
family breakup and its consequences. When a court orders mediation, 
parties may be able to bypass court-sponsored programs. Their 
attorneys can object to mediation, negotiate directly with opposing 
counsel, or choose a private mediator. ll7 Similarly, when parties can 
pay for services such as custody evaluation, courts will often allow them 
to substitute their own experts for the court's staff. 118 Further, the 
parties with attorneys often have negotiated agreements and can present 
them at the first court proceeding. In this way, they avoid referrals for 
services and remain "under the court's radar." For families who try to 
navigate the system without lawyers or resources for "outside" experts 
or services, involvement in the web of interventions in the new family 
court is almost impossible to avoid if they seek legal remedies, such as 
custody orders and child support. The following subpart illustrates how 
these potential risks play out when poor families bring their disputes to 
the new family courts. 
115. Zorza, supra note 114, at 47. 
116. /d. 
117. Statistics from one court system support the need for concern that court sponsored "services" 
are being utilized disproportionately by low-income families. THE WOMEN'S LAW CTR. OF MD., INC., 
CUSTODY AND FINANCIAL DISTRIBUTION IN MARYLAND: AN EMPIRCAL STUDY OF CUSTODY AND 
DIVORCE CASES FILED IN MARYLAND DURlNG FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 21-22 (2004), 
http://www.wlcmd.orglpdf/CustodyFinancialDistributionlnMD.pdf; THE WOMEN'S LAW CTR. OF MD., 
INC., supra note 42, at,22-24; see also Rubinson, supra note 97, at 119 n.98 (noting that "[m]ost of these 
mandatory [court-based] mediation programs are for family law cases in which the vast majority of 
disputants are low income."). 
118. Allegra, supra note 49, at 12 (as one custody evaluator described the process, "[w]hen 
[custody evaluation is warranted] the couple might agree to a private Custody Evaluation, performed by 
a psychologist, retained for this purpose. The clients' attorneys are often instrumental in helping their 
clients identify a psychologist, who is experienced in performing this type of evaluation. When there is 
no agreement to perform a private custody evaluation, but the psychological issue still exists as an 
impediment to custody-visitation arrangements, the court steps in and orders it own Custody 
Evaluation"). 
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2. Maryland's Experience 
a. Introduction 
Maryland was among a small group of states to explore new ways to 
handle family law matters by establishing family divisions in its five 
largest jurisdictions by court rule in 1998.119 Although Maryland did not 
adopt all components of the model family court,120 the courts embarked 
on an ambitious experiment to approach family law decisionmaking 
from a "therapeutic, holistic, and ecological" perspective "with the aim 
of improving the lives of families and children and maximizing the 
potential positive outcomes of court intervention.,,121 The system was 
designed by an array of impressive and thoughtful jurists, scholars, and 
practitioners. 122 Great care was invested in creating performance 
standards to measure the new reforms' impacts. Indeed, some 
evaluation of the family division has already taken place over the eight 
years since it was first established and there is every indication the 
judiciary in Maryland is committed to continuing the system's 
evaluation, oversight, and improvement. As such, the Maryland Family 
Divisions present a particularly good court system from which to draw 
examples of both the promise and risks of the new paradigm. 
As with similar efforts around the country, the planned reforms in the 
Family Divisions in Maryland have been difficult to achieve. The 
change that has taken place has come at a cost, particularly regarding 
family privacy and autonomy for low-income families. The court 
system has made some effort to evaluate the performance of courts' 
components. 123 But the negative impact on poor litigants' privacy and 
119. MD. R. 16-204. 
120. The Family Division is assigned fairly comprehensive jurisdiction matters including 
dissolution of marriage, child custody, visitation, alimony, spousal support, child support, establishment 
and termination of party -child relationship, criminal nonsupport, desertion, name changes, guardianship 
of minors and disabled person, involuntary admission to state facilities, family legal-medical issues, 
domestic violence, and some juvenile causes but did not adopt the "one judge, one family" principle. See 
id.; MD. R. 16-202(b)(I). 
121. MD. JUDICIARY, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND MEASURES FOR MARYLAND'S FAMILY 
DIVISIONS 48 (2002), http://www.courts.state.md.us/family/performancestandards.pdf. The report goes 
on to describe the mandate of the courts: "[TJhe Family Divisions must prove to the public and to 
Maryland's policymakers both the therapeutic qualities of the Family Divisions and the wisdom of the 
family justice system that invests in early intervention, prevention, and treatment as a means to secure 
the future well-being of Maryland's children and families." Id. at 53. 
122. Id. at 46. 
123. See, e.g., JOHN M. GREACEN, REPORT ON THE PROGRAMS TO ASSIST SELF REPRESENTED 
LITIGANTS OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND 3 (2004), 
http://www.courts.state.md.uslfamily/evaluations_mdsummary.pdf. ("This summary evaluation is 
intended to provide an overall assessment of Maryland's efforts for the benefit of the leadership of the 
state's judicial branch."). 
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autonomy has not been analyzed and is difficult to capture in such 
evaluations. Most parties entering the Family Divisions are 
unrepresented, making them particularly vulnerable to the risk of abuses 
of power within the court system. 124 Many of these litigants have no 
experience with the court system and thus have limited ability to 
distinguish requests from nonjudicial actors to participate voluntarily in 
programs from judicial authority to compel action. For those who 
regularly experience the state social service bureaucracy in other 
contexts-those who may have experienced the punitive power of child 
support, welfare, and child protection bureaucracies-the impulse to 
comply with requests from anyone within the courthouse is strong. 
Even with counsel, few "offers" for services are declined and judicial or 
nonjudicial exercises of authority are rarely challenged. 125 The 
following examples from two jurisdictions in Maryland illustrate the 
dangers of this system. 126 
b. Case #1: The Risk of "Post Judgment Monitoring,,127 
Mrs. Tate, a mother of two young children, had been in an extended 
relationship with her children's father who physically abused her for two 
years. She was granted sole physical and legal custody of her children 
and, in a separate proceeding, obtained a civil order of protection128 
against the children's father. Shortly after she obtained the order, her 
ex-husband was imprisoned for violating the protection order when he 
went to her home, pushed her onto the floor, and threw some of her 
124. See Berenson, supra note 96; see also MD. JUDICIARY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARYLAND 
CIRCUIT COURT FAMILY DIVISIONS AND FAMILY SERVICES PROGRAM 37 (2008), 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/family/pdfs/annualreports/annualreport06.pdf; LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 
DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF Low-
INCOME AMERICANS (2007), http://www.lsc.gov/JusticeGap.pdf. 
125. The combination of informal action, lack of clear standards, and limited litigant resources 
have always made judicial review of family court actions rare. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 46, at 706. 
126. Both of these examples involve the relatively uncommon situation of a poor litigant who is 
represented by counsel. LEGAL AID BUREAU, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 2007 (2007), 
http://www.mdlab.orglLAB%20docs/annual%20report..10202007 (finding Maryland Legal Aid is only 
able to provide counsel for 20% of those who are financially eligible for the services). I assume many 
more similar or even more egregious abuses occur daily where unrepresented parties do not know they 
can object or are unwilling to do so given the vague and unclear exercises of authority vested in all 
players in the new family court. 
127. This case is drawn from the caseload of the University of Baltimore Clinical Program in 
which the author taught from 1990-2008. See Family Law Clinic File (on file with author); see also 
University of Baltimore, School of Law, Clinical Law Program, http://law.ubalt.edulclinics/index.html 
(last visited October I, 2008). The clinic represents low-income families primarily from Baltimore, in 
the city's family court. Although much of what is reported here is a matter of public record in the court 
file, the names and identifying information have been changed to protect the privacy of the client. 
128. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506 (LexisNexis 2009). 
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belongings out the window. Upon his release, he filed a motion to 
modify custody. An attorney was appointed for the childI29 and the case 
was referred for mediation, despite the domestic violence. 13o The 
mother's counsel objected to mediation and the motion to modify 
custody was denied, as the legal standard of a "material change of 
circumstance[]" had not been met. 131 
Despite denying the motion to modify custody, the master132 viewed 
this as a "high confiict"m family who warranted extended court 
intervention. He modified the custody order to permit the father more 
time with the children, on the condition the father attend batterers' 
counseling. 134 The hearing examiner also set a series of review 
hearings, though no legal issues were pending. 135 At each subsequent 
hearing, the mother's behavior was scrutinized and the father gained 
more and more visitation without filing anything new and without 
complying with the court's previous order that he attend domestic 
violence counseling.136 The repeated hearings gave the father's attorney 
and the court appointed attorney for the childl37 the opportunity to argue 
the father's case over and over again to a series of judicial officers, none 
of whom fully understood the context of the case. 138 
In the last review hearing, the master doubled the number of 
129. Id. § 1-202. 
130. The Maryland court rules require the court to screen for domestic violence. MD. R. 9-
205(b )(2) ("If a party or a child represents to the court in good faith that there is a genuine issue of 
physical or sexual abuse of the party or child, and that, as a result, mediation would be inappropriate, the 
court shall not order mediation."). Despite the screening requirement, there is ample evidence many 
family courts in Maryland have no screening procedures in place. See Murphy & Rubinson, supra note 
85. 
131. Knott v. Knott, 806 A.2d 768, 772 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) ("The basis for modification of 
a final order concerning care, custody, or support of a minor child is material change of circumstances, 
pursuant to FL 12-104" which establishes the appropriate standard). 
132. In certain Family Law actions in Maryland, a "master" will hear domestic relations matters 
and has the power to regulate all proceedings in the hearing. MD. R. 9-208. 
133. For a thorough discussion of the "high conflict family," see Coates et aI., supra note 50. This 
phrase has become a term of art in family courts. Used in that context, "high conflict" seems to be 
synonymous with "poor," and triggers greater and more sustained intervention by the courts. 
134. Family Law Clinic File, supra note 127. 
135. /d. 
136. Id. Compliance issues with such orders are substantial, see, for example, Mandy Burton, 
Judicial Monitoring of Compliance: Introducing 'Problem Solving' Approaches to Domestic Violence in 
England and Wales, 20 INT'L 1.L. & POL'y & FAM. 366, 371 (2006) (citing Edward W. Gondolf, 
Mandatory Court Review and Bauerer Programme Compliance, 151. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 428 
(2000). This study found a significant increase in the number of men who completed court ordered 
counseling programs for batterers when mandatory court review was implemented in the Pittsburgh 
Domestic Violence Court. The percentage of no-shows fell from 36% to 6% and total compliance rose 
by 35 %); 
137. MD RULE 9-205.1 (governing appointment of child's counsel). 
138. Family Law Clinic File, supra note 127. 
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overnight visitation immediately after the mother expressed her 
discomfort with the father taking the child to church. 139 The master also 
appeared to be sympathetic to the attorney for the child's position that 
the father should not have to "keep paying for the domestic violence" 
even though there was evidence of such violence within months of the 
court hearing and though the father had not participated in batterer's 
counseling, as ordered by the court. This series of reviews and changes 
in the existing child access order all happened with no motion pending, 
no notice of a potential change to the mother, and no evidentiary basis or 
record from which to seek review. 
c. Case # 2: The Family Court Services Coordinator with Unlimited 
Authority140 
The statewide legal services organization in a small suburban 
Maryland jurisdiction began to get complaints shortly after the 
establishment of a Family Division in that court. A new position had 
been created and filled for a "family court services coordinator." 
According to a high-ranking legal services lawyer who received reports 
from field attorneys in that jurisdiction, this coordinator, a nonlawyer 
with a background in human services, acted as though her position "gave 
her license to play God" with the lives of the low-income litigants who 
came before the court in which she served. 141 She heard reports that 
described the coordinator as "terrorizing unrepresented litigants, 
particularly young mothers, in child access cases.,,142 The coordinator 
was reported as regularly threatening young mothers with loss of their 
children and, in some cases, making arrangements to take their kids 
from them and place them with third parties; ordering random drug tests 
without court order; conducting custody "evaluations" which the parent 
never saw and testifying about the contents of such evaluations in child 
access cases; and engaging in ex parte contacts with at least one Family 
Division judge on the merits of family cases. All of these actions were 
taken without a court order or other express authority. 
The court employee may have been well-intentioned in some 
instances, taking actions she believed were within her general authority 
139. Id. 
140. This illustration is drawn from interviews with a senior staff member at the Legal Aid Bureau 
of Maryland, a private, nonprofit, law firm providing free legal services to low-income persons 
statewide in Maryland. Legal Aid serves Baltimore City and Maryland's twenty-three counties from 
thirteen office locations. See Md. Legal Aid, http://www.mdlab.org (last visited March 20, 2009). 
141. Interview with Hannah Liebermann, Senior Staff Member, Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. (Jan. 3, 
2006). 
142. [d. 
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to engage in "differentiated case management.,,143 But for the parents 
for whom contact with their children was at stake, these actions 
subjected them to broad violations of their privacy with no practical 
means to object. While many of the problems in this jurisdiction were 
connected to a single individual's inappropriate conduct,l44 they 
demonstrate the risks when courts embrace ambitious agendas to address 
problems beyond dispute resolution without clearly designated 
procedures, grants of authority or, in some cases, the resources to 
appropriately train or hire professional staff. As the supervising attorney 
described, "I think [these] stories exemplify a good idea run horribly 
amuck, and the need to find that often elusive balance between 
formalized legal procedures, including all of the due process protections 
we used to expect, and the desire to address the spectrum of issues poor 
family law litigants often have.,,145 
III. REACHING THE GOAL OF A FULLY REALIZED ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN 
FAMILY LAW 
The traditional adversary system has failed many family law litigants, 
particularly in contested cases involving children. As family court 
proponents have accurately noted, prevailing legal standards make 
family court proceedings primarily a backward-looking process, 
designed to assign blame and, as a result, add to the acrimony between 
parents. But, perhaps just as problematic, those same indeterminate 
standards make it difficult for parties to predict outcomes in court, and 
decrease the likelihood of reaching early and less costly agreements 
about child access and related issues. Even if agreements are eventually 
reached in most cases, parties spend enormous resources to lawyers, 
investigators, and other experts to prove the other parent unfit. 
But even more critical, in terms of numbers of families affected and 
degree of harm, the traditional adversary system leaves vast numbers of 
unrepresented parties to navigate a court system structured with complex 
procedural and pleading rules. Often failure to understand these rules 
prevent access to the courts and a hearing on the merits. Even when 
such access is obtained, parties' inability to understand and use technical 
discovery and evidentiary rules makes it impossible to create a record 
upon which relief could be granted. If unrepresented parties are able to 
gather facts and present them in a way admissible in court, the broad 
143. MD. JUDICIARY,supra note 121, at 15. 
144. These problems were eventually reported by the Legal Aid Bureau to Maryland's 
Administrative Office of the Courts who responded quickly and appropriately. 
145. Interview with Hannah Lieberman, supra note 141. 
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indeterminate standards governing most family law cases make it 
difficult for parties to discern what might convince a judge to grant 
access to a child or other remedy.146 As a result, unrepresented parties 
are threatened with loss of their children. 147 
The problem-solving family court described in this Article is one 
response to the limits of the adversary system to resolve family cases in 
today's courts. But the new problem-solving courts do little to address 
the problems that most significantly contribute to the failure of the 
adversary system to protect children-indeterminate legal standards that 
encourage acrimony, delay, and expense for parents and lack of 
affordable sources of legal information and advice. And, by abandoning 
the long-held protections afforded litigants in the adversary system, the 
new courts make many families more vulnerable. The need for 
flexibility and a range of mUltidisciplinary actors to make decisions in 
the new courts creates a risk that some parties will unknowingly give up 
legal rights. In addition, ambitious efforts to educate, treat, and monitor 
families in conflict results in loss of privacy for families. The 
interventions and resultant loss of privacy may be unjustified in many 
cases. Even where some intervention may be helpful, the damage to 
family stability from the court's interference may outweigh any 
therapeutic benefits. And these risks to legal protections and family 
privacy fall disproportionately on the poor who most often fall under the 
state's scrutiny, including its courts. 
Solutions lie in improving and sharpening the focus of the adversary 
system so it can better perform its dispute resolution functions, rather 
than abandoning it for a new one. This involves combining elements 
from a number of family law reform movements that have been 
developing independently over the last decade. 
A. Improving the Legal Standard for Resolving Child Access Disputes 
The legal framework for deciding family law cases has been subject 
to substantial critique over the last two decades. The most promising 
effort for improving the adversary system in family law cases is the 
movement away from broad legal standards to rules. 148 Standards in 
146. For a detailed description of the experience of a typical pro se litigant in a family law case in 
the traditional adversary system, see Murphy, supra note 28, at 127-31. 
147. See. e.g., Frase v. Barnhart, 840 A. 2d 114 (Md. 2003) (describing the plight of an 
unrepresented mother who had onerous conditions placed on her right to continuing care and custody of 
her children without a finding of unfitness); see also Stephen H. Sachs, Seeking a RighI to Appointed 
Counsel in Civil Cases in Maryland, 37 U. BALT. L. REv. 5 (2007) (providing additional details of the 
Frase v. Barnhardt case from the perspective of the lawyer appealing her custody case). 
148. See generally Murphy, supra note II, at 226-31; Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and 
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family law for allocating family assets, deciding child custody and 
visitation, child support, and alimony historically were characterized by 
broad discretion. But the movement from discretion to rules for grounds 
of divorce started a trend away from such broad standards. 149 The shift 
from broad standards to rules is also firmly established for child 
supportl50 and is underway for alimony and property distribution. 151 But 
the most important shift for improving family dispute resolution for 
children would be to replace the prevailing best interests standard in 
child access cases with a predictable rule grounded in minimizing 
conflict at divorce. The first round of efforts in this direction focused on 
the primary caretaker rule. This proposed rule directed judges to 
presume children's interests are best served by continuing to live with 
their primary caretaker after parental breakup.152 Advocates of the 
primary caretaker rule argued that it best advanced certainty and 
predictability while furthering the goal of producing decisions in the 
Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REv. IIII 
(1999). 
149. See Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of 
Morality in Family Law, supra note 148. Some have argued that the movement away from fault-based 
divorce has hurt women and children. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, 
Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 719, 723 
(1997). But most agree that this change has "achieved the goals of reducing acrimony and trauma to 
families, particularly children, experiencing divorce. Murphy, supra, at 1202. 
ISO. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH ApPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 763 (1998) 
(describing child support enforcement techniques as having "undergone a revolution in recent decades 
as a result of federal involvement"). 
151. A number of proposals emphasize income sharing to equalize the post-divorce standards of 
living of divorcing couples. For some early articulations of these proposals see Jane Rutherford, Duty in 
Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 563-64, 573, 578-83, 592 
(1990); Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic 
Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. LJ. 2423 (1994); Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests 
on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 130, 159-60 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma 
Hill Kay eds., 1990) (proposing a system in which each spouse's interest in post-divorce income would 
be based on the length of marriage); Kaufman Ctr. for Family Law, Kaufman Alimony Guidelines, 
http://www.kaufmanalimonyguidelines.org! (last visited May 20, 2010) (interactive calculator to assist 
judges and lawyers in the state of Maryland to develop alimony awards to achieve equitable results). 
Some of these proposals have made their way into law. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (2009); MICH. 
COMPo LAWS ANN. § 552.13 (West 2009); Gregory J.M. v. Carolyn A.M., 442 A.2d 1373, 1377 (Del. 
1982); Ball v. Minnick, 648 A.2d 1192, 1196-97 (Pa. 1994). The ALI Principles also contain formulae 
designed to be predictably and consistently applied to return spouses to their premarital financial 
position after short marriages and compensate financially vulnerable spouses in longer marriages for 
their marital investment. AM. LAW INST, supra note 5, §§ 5.04, 5.13. 
152. As discussed earlier, Martha Fineman offered one of the earliest primary caretaker proposals 
as a way of reintroducing law as the "dominant discourse" in custody decisionmaking. See supra notes 
54-59 and accompanying text. Over the last two decades, both courts and commentators have offered 
variations of this rule. See Cochran, supra note 59, at 37; Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent 
Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 168, 180-82 (1984) (arguing 
for a presumptive rule in favor of the primary caretaker). 
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child's best interests. But very few primary caretaker proposals have 
found their way into law. 153 
More recently, the "approximation standard" has been proposed as an 
alternative rule that continues to emphasize minimizing trauma by 
presuming parents will continue prebreakup caretaking roles but 
promotes an expanded role for the noncustodial parent. 154 This 
approach, which has been embraced in the ALI Principles,155 responds to 
many of the concerns about child custody proceedings in the adversary 
system under the best interests standard. Its relatively straightforward 
factual inquiry about parenting behavior should minimize the trauma of 
family breakup. It should also make court decisions more predictable, 
thus encouraging informed agreements in mediation and less costly trials 
when agreement is not reached. 156 For this reason, advocates for 
healthier and more therapeutic family dispute processes should advocate 
for its adoption. 
B. Make Nonlegal Services Readily Available But Not Mandatory 
In addition to substantive law changes, incorporating some elements 
of the problem solving approach into the adversary structure would 
improve the family dispute resolution system. Using dispute resolution 
to offer families needed services-educational, mental health, and 
financial-is a good idea. But it may be both impractical and 
153. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 361 (W. Va. 1981). Garska has been modified by 
recent statutory changes in West Virginia that continue to instruct judges to allocate custodial 
responsibility for children based upon past caretaking responsibilities, but do not create a presumption in 
favor of the primary caretaker. W. VA. CODE § 48-9-206 (2009) (stating the court shall take into 
account the past caretaking responsibilities when deciding custody sharing); see also The Ramifications 
of West Virginia's Codified Child Custody Law: A Departure from Garska v. McCoy, 106 W. VA. L. 
REv. 389 (2004). After its adoption in Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Minn. 1985), the 
Minnesota Legislature rejected the primary caretaker presumption and restored the best interest 
standard. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2009); see also Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of 
the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year 
Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REv. 427, 428-29 (1990) (concluding 
Minnesota courts continue to place strong emphasis on the primary caretaker as a factor in the best 
interest equation). 
154. Elizabeth Scott first proposed the "approximation" rule in which the decision maker "focuses 
(almost) exclusively on the past relationship between parents and child and seeks to approximate as 
closely as possible the predivorce patterns of parental responsibility in the custody arrangement." 
Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REv. 615, 630 
(1992). 
155. AM. LAW INST., supra note 5, § 2.02; see also Robert J. Levy, Custody Laws and the ALI's 
Principles: A Little History, a Little Policy, and Some Very Tentative Judgments, in RECONCEIVING THE 
FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION, supra note 5, at 67, 74. 
156. Scott, supra note 154, at 643. 
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duplicative to create in-house programs staffed by court personnel for 
most services. Instead, family courts should coordinate with appropriate 
state, local, and private agencies to make meaningful referrals to parties 
who need this assistance. In this way, courts can preserve resources for 
their essential dispute resolution function. 
Further, participation in most services should be voluntary, rather 
than a condition of receiving a legal remedy to which a party is 
otherwise entitled. 157 Services such as post judgment monitoring by a 
parent coordinator and, in the absence of unfitness, parenting education 
are more effective and less intrusive if desired by the parties receiving 
such support. At a minimum, a judicial officer should have to make 
clearly defined findings before compulsory services are ordered. Those 
administering such services should be properly trained, credentialed, and 
have legally defined authority .158 
C. Improve the Quality of Family Mediation 
Another element of the problem solving courts that needs to be 
preserved, but refined, is mediation. While mediation programs 
predated many family courts, the family court movement has made them 
a centerpiece of conflict resolution. 159 Mediation, combined with 
parenting plans,160 can offer families a private, perhaps less costly, 161 
157. The imposition of services as a prerequisite to divorce may be subject to constitutional 
challenge. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 410 U.S. 371 (1971) (finding that because the state's regulation 
of marriage and divorce, in the generic sense, is an assumption of governmental power, the state cannot 
deny access to its courts for divorce by requiring a court fee from those who cannot pay). 
158. The Maryland Rules Committee is currently working on rules to standardize the work of 
parenting coordinators) and custody evaluators. See Parenting Coordination in Cases Involving Child 
Custody (Draft Rules 2009). 
159. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
160. Robert A Baruch Bush & Sally Ganong Pope, Transformative Mediation: Changing the 
Quality of Family Conflict Interaction, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, 
AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 68, at 53, 55, 57, 59--63, 67--69 (another recent article describing 
parenting plans especially in connection with mediation); see also Linda D. Elrod & Mildred D. Dale, 
Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 
FAM. L.Q. 381 (2008). 
161. Many claim that mediation improves access to dispute resolution for the participants by 
giving parties the opportunity to resolve disputes with fewer costs. The process is simple, 
communication is direct, and the formalities of court are discarded. Parties have more control over the 
process and can arrive at resolution of their disputes more quickly and without substantial time spent in 
court proceedings away from work and other responsibilities. See. e.g.. FORREST S. MOSTEN, THE 
COMPLETE GUIDE TO MEDIATION: THE CUTTING EDGE ApPROACH TO FAMILY LAW PRACTICE 60 
(1997); Wayne D. Brazil, Why Should Courts Offer Nonbinding ADR Services?, 16 ALTERNATIVES TO 
THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 65 (1998) (arguing that the poor should have access to court-sponsored 
alternative dispute resolution and not be "relegated" to the delays and expense of the adversarial 
system). 
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setting to plan for parenting of children after breakup. Mediation helps 
parties avoid the public acrimony of a trial and focus on common 
ground, thus preserving family relationships. Mediation might even 
offer a better alternative than the adversary system for accommodating 
diverse family traditions. Mediation's informality gives it the potential 
to address cultural differences in ways litigation may not. 162 
Despite these advantages, the virtually unchecked risk that parties 
without lawyers will enter agreements without adequate information and 
advice makes the current widespread and often compulsory mediation of 
child access disputes troubling. Many of the current programs have no 
mechanism to ensure that unrepresented parties can obtain legal 
information or advice before, during, or after mediation. It is, therefore, 
risky to require low income and unrepresented litigants to use this 
process as an alternative to litigation to make informed agreements. 
Other concerns about the unbridled enthusiasm for mediation of child 
access disputes include bias toward joint custody among some 
mediators l63 and the inadequacy of most court-sponsored programs to 
screen cases for domestic violence. l64 Responding to these risks and 
concerns does not require abandoning mediation in favor of trials in all 
cases. Instead, mediation can exist as an option in the adversary system 
if we develop a structure that provides resources to ensure individuals 
receive legal advice when needed during the mediation process. A range 
of solutions exist to address these issues from reconceiving the role of 
the mediator as including educating the parties about their legal rightsl65 
to providing limited legal representation during mediation. 166 
D. Guarantee Access to Legal Information, Advice, or Representation 
The problem of lack of access to legal information is not limited to 
mediation, but pervades the family justice system. Judges, advocates, 
and scholars agree that the primary reason the traditional family justice 
162. Harold Abramson, Crossing Borders Into New Ethical Territory: Ethical Challenges When 
Mediating Cross· Culturally, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 921,922-37,942 (2008). 
163. See, e.g., Carol Bohmer & Marilyn Ray, Effects of Different Dispute Resolution Methods on 
Women and Children After Divorce, 28 FAM. L. Q. 223, 234 (1994). 
164. See Murphy & Rubinson, supra note 85. 
165. Engler, supra note 80, at 1989; see also Russell Engler, Toward a Context-Based Civil Right 
to Counsel Through "Access to Justice" Initiatives, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Jul.-Aug. 2006, at 196; 
Waldman,_supra note 72, at 741. 
166. See, e.g., Jon Moseley, Mediation Program Acquires New Partner. MD. BAR BULL., Jan. 
2010, available at http://www.msba.orgldepartments/commpubllpublicationslbar_bultl20 1 0/ 
january/probono.asp (describing the University of Baltimore's Family Mediation Clinic's Pro Bono 
Representation Project in which parties in child access mediation are afforded free limited representation 
during court ordered mediation sessions). 
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system is dysfunctional is that the assumption upon which the system 
was built-a client and lawyer on each side-is no longer true. 167 The 
most critical reform, therefore, necessary to fully realize the benefits of 
the adversary system in cases involving children is access to legal 
information, advice, and in some cases, full representation. Some 
necessary supports are already in place. These include developing 
standardized family law pleadings,168 establishing court-based pro se 
projects to provide limited legal advice to unrepresented parties in 
family law cases,169 telephone hodines,170 educational websites,171 and 
innovations in the delivery of direct legal services, such as limited 
representation at critical stages in the dispute.172 
But even in those jurisdictions where most or all of these programs 
are available, legal scholars, judges, and advocates have long recognized 
that such support is inadequate in contested child access cases. 173 The 
right to counsel in civil cases affecting fundamental rights-the so called 
Civil Gideon-has been advanced in the context of a wide variety of 
issues including the right to housing,174 health and other government 
167. See, e.g., Judges' Views of Pro Se Litigants' Effect on Courts, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. , 
July·Aug. 2006, 228 (detailing the ways in which pro se litigants burden the court); Jona Goldschmidt, 
The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar 
Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36 (2002); Paul R. Tremblay, Acting "A Very Moral Type of God": 
Triage Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2475 (1999); MD. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM'N, 
INTERIM REPORT AND RECCOMENDATIONS (2009), http://www.courts.state.md.us/mdatjc/pdfs/ 
interimreportl I 1009.pdf. 
168. See BONNIE ROSE HOUGH, DESCRIPTION OF CALIFORNIA COURTS' PROGRAMS FOR SELF· 
REPRESENTED LITIGANTS (2003), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/equalaccess/ 
documentslharvard.pdf. 
169. Michael Millemann et aI., Rethinking the Full-Service Legal Representational Model: A 
Maryland Experiment, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 1178, 1181 n.IO (describing the 
joint efforts of the University of Baltimore Family Law Clinic and the University of Maryland in 
establishing the first court-based Pro Se Projects in Baltimore City, Baltimore, Anne Arundel, and 
Montgomery counties.) For a description of the pro se assistance projects in each of the circuits in 
Maryland, see Maryland Judiciary, Family Law Self-Help Centers, 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/family/selfhelp.html(last visited May 20, 2010); see also Margaret 
Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se Clinics a Reasonable Response to the Lack of Pro Bono 
Legal Services and Should Law School Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1897 (1999); 
Nathalie Gilfrich et aI., Law Students Assist Pro Se Litigants in Maryland, 81 JUDICATURE 82 (1997). 
170. See, e.g., The Women's Law Ctr. Of Md., Inc., Projects, http://www.wlcmd.orglprojects.html 
(last visited March 15,2009) (maintaining several hotlines, including a Family Law Hotline and a Legal 
Fonns Helpine). 
171. See, e.g., Maryland Legal Assistance Network, Family Law Center, http://www.peoples-
law.info/Home/PublicWeblIndexPageslI390000 (last visited May 20, 2010). 
172. See FORREST S. MOSTEN, UNBUNDLING LEGAL SERVICES: A GUIDE To DELIVERING LEGAL 
SERVICES A LA CARTE (2000). 
173. Gi I frich et aI., supra note 169; (describing the "most important advice" given by law students 
staffing pro se offices was to "retain counsel" in cases involving child custody but noting the lack of free 
representation). 
174. See, e.g., Andrew Scherer, Why People Who Face Losing Their homes in Legal Proceedings 
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benefits,175 and employment and income maintenance.176 But advocacy 
for a right to counsel in civil cases has gathered particular momentum in 
the child access area. l77 Most argue for a right to counsel based on the 
constitutionally protected right to family privacyl78 or on procedural due 
process grounds in child access cases brought by the government. 179 
Most of these arguments are grounded in federal constitutional claims, 
but some scholars180 and courts181 have framed arguments in terms of 
state constitutional law. Others have advocated for this right on the 
general principle that equal justice under law cannot exist where some 
parents are denied meaningful access to the courts because they cannot 
afford counsel. I82 Whatever the theory for insuring this right, the 
presence of counsel would have a profound effect in providing 
meaningful hearings in child access proceedings within the traditional 
adversary system, particularly if the standards governing child access 
cases were modified as this Article has proposed. 183 
Must Have a Right to Counsel, 3 CARDOZO PUBLIC L. POL'y & ETHICS J. 699 (2006); Rachel Klienman, 
Housing Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Eviction Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1507 (2004); Andrew 
Scherer, Gideon's Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants in 
Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 557 (1988); Frances Werner, Toward a Right to 
Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction Proceedings, 17 HOUSING L. BULL. 65 (1987). 
175. See Lisa Brodoff et aI., The ADA: One Avenue to Appointed Counsel Before a Full Civil 
Gideon, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 609 (2004). 
176. See Andrew Scherer, Securing a Civil Right to Counsel: The [mportance of Collaborating, 
30 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 675, 676 (2006). 
177. John Nethercut, "This Issue Will Not Go Away": Continuing to Seek the Right to Counsel in 
Civil Cases, 38 CLEARING HOUSE REv., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 481. 
178. Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 
40 CLEARINGHOUSE REv., July-Aug 2006, at 245. 
179. Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Termination of Parental Rights 
Proceedings: The States' Response to Lassiter, 14 TOURO L. REv. 247 (1997). 
180. See, e.g., Mary Helen McNeal, Toward a "Civil Gideon" Under the Montana Constitution: 
Parental Rights as the Starting Point, 66 MONT. L. REV. 81 (2005); James A. Bamberger, Confirming 
the Constitutional Right of Meaningful Access to the Courts in Non-Criminal Cases in Washington 
State, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 383 (2005); Deborah Perluss, Washington's Constitutional Right to 
Counsel in Civil Cases: Access to Justice v. Fundamental [nterest, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 571 (2004); 
Earl Johnson Jr. & Elizabeth Schwartz, Beyond Payne: The Case for a Legally Enforceable Right to 
Representation in Civil Casesfor Indigent California Litigants, 11 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 249 (1978). 
181. Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview of State-Court Right-to-Counsel Decisions, 
40 CLEARINGHOUSE REv., July-Aug. 2006, at 186; Karen J. Coombs, What Gives You the Right?: 
Recent Decisions on the Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 44 N.H. BAR J., Sept. 2004, at II. 
182. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, [n the [nterests of Justice: Human Rights and the Right to Counsel 
in Civil Cases, 25 TOURO L. REv 147, (2009); Dennis A. Kaufman, The Tipping Point on the Scales of 
Civil Justice, 25 TOURO L. REv 347 (2009). 
183. The "Civil Gideon" movement won a substantial victory in October, 2009 when the 
California became "the first state in the nation to establish a model program providing a right to counsel 
for low income people in critical civil cases" including child custody, housing, domestic violence and 
elder abuse. California Becomes Nation's First State to Assure Lawyers in Civil Cases, CAL. CHRON., 
Oct. 13,2009, available at http://www.californiachronicle.com/articles/view/123693. The language of 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Before we reject the adversary system for child access cases, we 
should evaluate its efficacy with the improvements this Article 
advocates. Reforming the substantive legal standard governing child 
access cases will assist parties in focusing on parenting in these 
proceedings instead of trying to meet the broad definition of unfitness 
inherent in the best interests standard. Further, the rule-based nature of 
the approximation or primary caretaker standard will assist parties in 
predicting outcomes if cases go to litigation, thus making it easier to 
evaluate agreements proposed in mediation. Making nonlegal services 
voluntary would limit the interference on family privacy. Finally, 
offering legal information and advice and, in some circumstances, full 
legal representation, would permit more informed use of alternative 
dispute resolution and a properly functioning adversary system. Justice 
can, indeed, be tempered with mercy if we work to improve, rather than 
abandon, the family justice system. 
the legislation itself recognizes how critical legal representation is to fully realizing the benefits of the 
adversary system: 
The adversarial system of justice relied upon in the United States inevitably allocates to 
the parties the primary responsibility for discovering the relevant evidence, finding the 
relevant legal principles, and presenting them to a neutral judge or jury. Discharging 
these responsibilities generally requires the knowledge and skills of a legally trained 
professional. The absence of representation not only disadvantages parties, it has a 
negative effect on the functioning of the judicial system. When parties lack legal 
counsel, courts must cope with the need to provide guidance and assistance to ensure that 
the matter is properly administered and the parties receive a fair trial or hearing. 
A.B. 590, 2009-20 10 Sess. § I (i) (Cal. 2009), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-
I 0IbiIVasm/ab_0551-0600/ab_590_bill_20091 0 ll_chaptered.pdf. 

